@antv/g-base @0.6.16
Maintainers
Keywords
Dependencies (11)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| tslib | ^2.0.3 | auto_approved |
| d3-ease | ^1.0.5 | auto_approved |
| d3-timer | ^1.0.9 | auto_approved |
| @antv/util | ~2.0.13 | No greenflagged match |
| @antv/g-math | ^0.1.9 | No greenflagged match |
| d3-interpolate | ^3.0.1 | auto_approved |
| detect-browser | ^5.1.0 | auto_approved |
| @antv/path-util | ~2.0.5 | No greenflagged match |
| @types/d3-timer | ^2.0.0 | auto_approved |
| @antv/matrix-util | ^3.1.0-beta.1 | No greenflagged match |
| @antv/event-emitter | ^0.1.1 | auto_approved |
Dev Dependencies (5)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| less | ^4.1.1 | auto_approved |
| gl-matrix | ^3.0.0 | auto_approved |
| tsc-watch | ^4.0.0 | No greenflagged match |
| @antv/torch | ^1.0.0 | Not imported |
| npm-run-all | ^4.1.5 | auto_approved |
Transitive Dependency Tree
Changes from v0.5.16
Dependency Changes
Script Changes
+ preinstallFile Changes
Risk Dispositions (6 applicable to this version, 0 other)
Accepted rules are downgraded to INFO on future analyses; rejected rules escalate to CRITICAL.
| Rule | Source | Disposition | Author | Reason | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
install-script:preinstall |
install-scripts | reject | AI | AI (install-scripts): Malicious preinstall running obfuscated payload; generalizes to this package. | |
obfuscated-file:index.js |
source-diff | reject | AI | AI (source-diff): Obfuscated malware payload; stable reject for this package. | |
url-dep:@antv/setup |
npm-metadata | reject | AI | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned GitHub dep in optionalDependencies used to smuggle payload. | |
semgrep:env-spread |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): Credential harvesting via process.env spread in obfuscated code. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-while-true |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): javascript-obfuscator output in malicious payload. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-hex-functions |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): javascript-obfuscator hex function names in malicious payload. |
SAST Findings (11)
Script: bun run index.js
Dependency '@antv/setup' in `optionalDependencies` points to 'github:antvis/G2#1916faa365f2788b6e193514872d51a242876569' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atool.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
while(!![]) loop is a signature of javascript-obfuscator output > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
Review Summary
Risk score: 100 (capped from 273). Findings: 10 high (+250), 2 medium (+20), 1 low (+3), 1 info (+0).
Published to npm: