tsc-watch
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:node-cleanup | AI (dependencies): node-cleanup is a standard process cleanup utility; appropriate for a compiler watcher managing child processes. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.2.0 | 4 / 11 | |
| 7.1.1 | 4 / 11 | |
| 7.1.0 | 4 / 11 | |
| 7.0.0 | 4 / 11 |
v7.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.