zlibcontext
Simple, synchronous deflate/inflate for buffers (ZLibContext modification)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:preinstall | AI (install-scripts): node-waf configure build is the canonical pre-node-gyp native addon build command for early Node.js packages (~2010-2012). This is a legitimate zlib native binding, not malicious. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Binaries are compiled native addon artifacts (.node, .o files) from building a C++ zlib binding. Expected output for a native Node.js addon from this era. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:install | AI (install-scripts): This is a native C zlib binding; './configure && make' is the standard build pattern for native Node.js addons. Stable and expected for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Signals (no keywords, no deps, tiny index.js) are consistent with a minimal native binding wrapper, not spam. Package has legitimate purpose and trusted publisher. | ai |
v1.0.9
2 findingsScript: ./configure && make
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • lib/zlib_bindings.node • build/.conf_check_0/testbuild/default/test_1.o • build/.conf_check_0/testbuild/default/testprog • build/default/src/node_zlib_1.o • build/default/zlib_bindings.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
3 findingsScript: node-waf clean || true; node-waf configure build
Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • lib/zlib_bindings.node • build/.conf_check_0/testbuild/default/test_1.o • build/.conf_check_0/testbuild/default/testprog • build/default/src/node_zlib_1.o • build/default/zlib_bindings.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.