waterline-schema
The core schema builder used in the Waterline ORM.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): rachaelshaw is a known Sails.js core team member; transition from particlebanana (also Sails.js core) is a legitimate org-internal handoff, not a compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): mikermcneil and rachaelshaw are both Sails.js/Balderdashy core team members; adding them is expected for this ecosystem package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): All three new deps (@sailshq/lodash, flaverr, rttc) are established Sails.js ecosystem packages; @sailshq/lodash directly replaces the removed lodash dep. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package published in 2018, before npm Sigstore provenance was available. Not a meaningful risk signal for this era. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.20 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.19 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.18 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.17 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.16 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.15 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.14 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.13 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.12 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.11 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.10 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.9 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.8 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 1 |
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.13
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.12
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.