waterline-cursor
waterline-cursor ================ [](https://travis-ci.org/balderdashy/waterline-cursor) [](http://badge.fury
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Published by balderdashy (Sails.js/Waterline org) with a strong track record; 0.0.0 reflects an early-stage utility package, not a throwaway malicious package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Sparse README and missing repo URL are consistent with an internal utility from an established org; package keywords and author align with the Waterline ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): sgress454 is a well-known Sails.js/Waterline core contributor with 1390 approved packages; the 2014 transition from balderdashy is a legitimate org handoff. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): sgress454 is a trusted Sails.js ecosystem maintainer; addition is consistent with legitimate team transition within the Waterline project. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package was first published in 2014, predating Sigstore provenance; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.6 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 3 / 0 |
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.