ware
Easily create your own middleware layer.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; no CI/CD provenance expected for legacy packages. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from segmentio org account to ianstormtaylor (Segment co-founder) in 2014 is a legitimate intra-org transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): ianstormtaylor and segment are both part of the Segment organization; legitimate maintainer list update. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): co is a well-known, legitimate generator library by TJ Holowaychuk; appropriate dependency for middleware composition. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 2 |
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-09-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.