vitepress-plugin-group-icons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publish with SLSA attestation; legitimate automation change for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): CI-based publish via GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; gitHead absence is expected in this workflow. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy aligns with CI migration; SLSA attestation and consistent repo metadata reduce takeover risk. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/yuyinws | AI (email-domain): Author field contains a GitHub profile URL, not an email address; no real domain hijack risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@iconify-json/logos | AI (phantom-deps): Icon data package referenced in config; not directly imported but legitimately bundled. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@iconify-json/vscode-icons | AI (phantom-deps): Icon data package referenced in config; not directly imported but legitimately bundled. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.5 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.7.4 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.7.3 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.7.2 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.7.1 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.7.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.9 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.8 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.7 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.5 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.4 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.3 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.2 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.1 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.6.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.5.5 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.5.4 | 3 / 14 | |
| 1.5.3 | 3 / 14 |
v1.7.5
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/yuyinws' uses domain 'https://github.com/yuyinws' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.9
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.8
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.7
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.5
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/yuyinws' uses domain 'https://github.com/yuyinws' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.