vite-envs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:index.js | AI (source-diff): Encoded string is the llhttp WASM binary, a standard bundled HTTP parser dependency — not malicious. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:bin/main.js | AI (source-diff): Same llhttp WASM binary in the bundled CLI entry point — benign bundled dependency. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Passes process.env to child vite process — required for dev-server spawning, not exfiltration. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-bulk-read | AI (semgrep): Enumerates process.env but immediately filters to declared keys only — core feature of an env-var injection tool. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decoding is a documented feature for encoding env values in .env files, not payload hiding. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.7.2 | 0 / 20 | |
| 4.7.1 | 0 / 20 | |
| 4.7.0 | 0 / 20 | |
| 4.6.2 | 0 / 20 | |
| 4.6.1 | 0 / 20 |
v4.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.0
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.2
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/garronej/vite-envs/blob/3007301f348848a5fbe5886de9f313f188cab95c/src/bin/updateTypes.ts#L6 4 | export async function updateTypes(): Promise<void> { 5 | const child = child_process.spawn("npx", ["vite", "dev"], { > 6 | env: { 7 | ...process.env, 8 | [updateTypingScriptEnvName]: ""
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.6.1
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/garronej/vite-envs/blob/8b201dfc737fc9d1b357c8c6850063563c1a5058/src/bin/updateTypes.ts#L6 4 | export async function updateTypes(): Promise<void> { 5 | const child = child_process.spawn("npx", ["vite", "dev"], { > 6 | env: { 7 | ...process.env, 8 | [updateTypingScriptEnvName]: ""
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.