urql
A highly customizable and versatile GraphQL client for React
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): urql migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance attestation (publishConfig.provenance=true). Publisher change to GitHub Actions is intentional and verifiable via Sigstore attestation. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 94)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0.2 | 2 / 13 | |
| 5.0.1 | 2 / 13 | |
| 5.0.0 | 2 / 13 | |
| 4.2.2 | 2 / 13 | |
| 4.2.1 | 2 / 13 | |
| 4.2.0 | 2 / 13 | |
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.0.7 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.0.6 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.0.5 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.0.4 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.0.3 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.0.2 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.0.1 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.0.4 | 2 / 15 | |
| 3.0.3 | 2 / 13 | |
| 3.0.2 | 2 / 13 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 13 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 13 | |
| 2.2.3 | 2 / 13 | |
| 2.2.2 | 2 / 13 | |
| 2.2.1 | 2 / 13 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.1.3 | 3 / 11 | |
| 2.1.2 | 3 / 11 | |
| 2.1.1 | 3 / 11 | |
| 2.1.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 2.0.6 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.5 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.4 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.3 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.2 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.1 | 2 / 10 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.11.6 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.11.5 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.11.4 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.11.3 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.11.2 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.11.1 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.11.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.10.3 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.10.2 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.10.1 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.10.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.9.8 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.9.7 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.9.6 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.9.5 | 2 / 11 | |
| 1.9.4 | 2 / 11 |
v5.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-05-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-05-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.