union
A hybrid buffered / streaming middleware kernel backwards compatible with connect.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from indexzero to jcrugzz within the flatiron/nodejitsu org, occurred in 2016. Both are known contributors. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; no CI/CD provenance expected for legacy packages of this age. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process usage is in examples/simple/middleware/gzip-decode.js — example code using spawn for gzip, not a runtime concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.4.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.4.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.4.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.4.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.4.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.3.8 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.3.7 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.3.6 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.3.5 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.3.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.3.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.3.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.1.8 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.1.6 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.1.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 1 |
v0.5.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.4.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.4.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-09-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.4.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: swaagie.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-07-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-07-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2012-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2012-03-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.