unimport
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): unimport is part of the unjs/antfu ecosystem; publisher changed to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation, consistent with legitimate automation of releases. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): fast-glob is a well-established, widely-trusted glob library replacing tinyglobby; the swap is benign for this utility package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of Sigstore provenance is informational for an established package; antfu's track record and ecosystem trust mitigate this signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Flagged maintainers (antfu, pi0, danielroe) are prominent, legitimate open-source contributors in the Vue/Vite/Nuxt ecosystem. Spam-publisher signal is a false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:escape-string-regexp | AI (phantom-deps): escape-string-regexp is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep signal is a false positive for bundled packages where imports may be indirect. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:pkg-types | AI (dependencies): pkg-types is a legitimate, widely-used unjs ecosystem package; unvetted-dep signal is a false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.3.0 | 14 / 16 | |
| 6.2.0 | 14 / 15 | |
| 6.1.2 | 14 / 14 | |
| 6.1.1 | 14 / 14 | |
| 6.1.0 | 14 / 14 | |
| 6.0.2 | 14 / 14 | |
| 6.0.1 | 14 / 14 | |
| 6.0.0 | 14 / 14 | |
| 5.7.0 | 14 / 14 | |
| 5.6.0 | 14 / 14 | |
| 5.5.0 | 14 / 14 | |
| 5.4.1 | 14 / 14 | |
| 5.4.0 | 14 / 14 | |
| 5.1.0 | 14 / 15 | |
| 5.0.1 | 14 / 15 | |
| 4.1.1 | 14 / 15 | |
| 3.14.4 | 14 / 15 | |
| 3.14.0 | 14 / 15 | |
| 3.13.4 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.13.3 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.13.2 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.13.1 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.13.0 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.12.0 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.11.1 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.11.0 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.10.1 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.10.0 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.9.1 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.9.0 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.8.0 | 13 / 14 | |
| 3.7.2 | 13 / 14 |
v6.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.14.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.14.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.13.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.13.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.13.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.13.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.13.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: antfu.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.9.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.