uid2
strong uid
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:uuid | AI (typosquat): uid2 is a legitimate, long-standing UID generation package unrelated to uuid. The name similarity is coincidental; no impersonation intent. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance on npm by years; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.