uid-safe
URL and cookie safe UIDs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): random-bytes is a crypto-utils org package by the same maintainer, a purposeful replacement for mz; no malicious signal. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): dougwilson is a named contributor in package.json and a highly trusted npm publisher; the jongleberry→dougwilson transition is a documented, legitimate handoff within the crypto-utils org. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:random-bytes | AI (dependencies): random-bytes is a companion package from the same crypto-utils org and maintainer (dougwilson); it is a well-known, purpose-built cryptographic utility, not a suspicious dependency. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance attestation; absence is expected and not a security concern for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.5 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.1.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2.1.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.1.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.1.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 1.0.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 1 |
v2.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-10-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-08-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-01-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-02-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.