uid-promise
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Vercel acquisition of original author's packages; repo moved to vercel org, consistent with known corporate transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are Vercel employees and bots; legitimate org transfer. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Original authors (leo/rauchg) are Vercel founders; removal consistent with org-level ownership transfer. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change to vercel-release-bot is consistent with Vercel's CI/CD pipeline adoption. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase reflects TypeScript rewrite with dual CJS/ESM build outputs, not injected payload. | ai |
v2.0.5
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (leo, rauchg) were replaced by new maintainers (nwienert, gdborton, matt.straka, nick.tracey, zeit-bot, vercel-release-bot). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-05-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.