typescript-api
TypeScript API exposed (includes definition file)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): The jedhunsaker→jedmao transition occurred in 2014 and is a documented account rename; author email in package.json ties both identities to the same person. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Same 2014 account rename event; jedmao is the legitimate maintainer with a clean 13-package track record. Not a risk for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require in wrapper.js loads the TypeScript compiler from a computed path — standard wrapper pattern, no arbitrary user input involved. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by many years; absence of attestation is expected and not a risk signal here. | ai |
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.