typedoc
Create api documentation for TypeScript projects.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder | AI (npm-metadata): DevDep from same org (TypeStrong), SHA-pinned, not shipped to consumers. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New deps are established packages replacing prior equivalents; consistent with documented major version changes. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Large file count reflects legitimate major version expansion with new locale/theme build outputs. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:marked | AI (dependencies): marked is a mainstream Markdown parser; its use in a documentation generator like typedoc is expected and benign. No advisories affect this version range. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy is an artifact of comparing against v0.25.0 as baseline. TypeDoc is actively maintained; the gap reflects registry data limitations, not actual inactivity. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation provides stronger commit linkage than gitHead. Missing gitHead is expected when publishing via GitHub Actions with Sigstore. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): TypeStrong/TypeDoc migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation. This is a legitimate infrastructure change for a well-known package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): TypeDoc is a well-established documentation generator; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:markdown-it | AI (dependencies): markdown-it is a well-known Markdown parser; its use in a documentation generator is expected and legitimate. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@gerrit0/mini-shiki | AI (dependencies): @gerrit0/mini-shiki is a syntax highlighter maintained by the TypeDoc author; its use in a documentation generator is expected and legitimate. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.28.19 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.18 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.17 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.16 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.15 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.14 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.13 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.12 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.11 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.10 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.9 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.8 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.7 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.6 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.5 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.28.4 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.25.10 | 4 / 15 | |
| 0.25.0 | 4 / 15 |
v0.28.19
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v0.28.18
3 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.28.17
4 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.28.16
4 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.28.15
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.14
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.13
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.12
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.11
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.10
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.9
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.8
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.7
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.6
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.5
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.28.4
3 findingsDependency '@typestrong/fs-fixture-builder' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:TypeStrong/fs-fixture-builder#34113409e3a171e68ce5e2b55461ef5c35591cfe' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: typedoc-bot.
v0.25.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.