tinyexec
A minimal library for executing processes in Node
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from 43081j to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance. This is a legitimate transition to automated publishing for the tinylibs org. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.4 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.2.3 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.2.2 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.2.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 13 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 13 | |
| 1.0.4 | 0 / 12 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 12 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 10 |
v1.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (43081j) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-23, but 43081j is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (43081j) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-23, but 43081j is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.