temporary
The lord of tmp.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from vesln to willscott is documented in package.json contributors field; willscott is a long-standing npm account (7+ years) with a clean track record. Legitimate handoff. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): willscott is explicitly listed as a contributor in package.json alongside the original author; consistent with a transparent, legitimate maintainer transition. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; no provenance is expected for this era of package. Not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.0.8 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.7 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 3 |
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.