template-utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change jonschlinkert→doowb occurred in Dec 2014; both are well-known npm ecosystem contributors. This is a legitimate historical maintainer transition, not a compromise. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pretty-hrtime | AI (phantom-deps): pretty-hrtime is referenced in config/build files only; not a security concern for this utility package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): doowb is a long-established npm publisher (98 packages, 1238 approved) and known collaborator in the jonschlinkert ecosystem. Addition is legitimate. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:verb | AI (dependencies): verb is jonschlinkert's own documentation generator; consistent with this package's purpose and publisher identity. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): All newly added deps (verb, async, chalk, globby, etc.) are well-known legitimate packages from jonschlinkert's ecosystem; no suspicious additions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:js-comments | AI (dependencies): js-comments is a jonschlinkert package consistent with this template utility ecosystem; no malicious indicators across 11+ years. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:lookup-deps | AI (dependencies): lookup-deps is a jonschlinkert package consistent with this template utility ecosystem; no malicious indicators across 11+ years. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:chalk | AI (phantom-deps): chalk is declared as a runtime dependency in package.json; phantom detection likely reflects indirect usage in lib files. Not a security concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; absence is expected for this era of publishing and not a security signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.2 | 17 / 3 | |
| 0.6.1 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.0 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.5.1 | 12 / 3 | |
| 0.5.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.4.1 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.4.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.2.0 | 15 / 2 | |
| 0.1.8 | 16 / 2 | |
| 0.1.7 | 16 / 2 | |
| 0.1.6 | 16 / 2 | |
| 0.1.5 | 16 / 2 | |
| 0.1.4 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.1.2 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.1.1 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 7 / 3 |
v0.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.