temp
Temporary files and directories
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process usage is confined to example files (examples/grepcount.js), not library code. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Signals are artifacts of early npm conventions (~2009). Package has 8.3M weekly downloads and a long legitimate history; not a spam/bogus package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change occurred in 2018; new publisher miguelsolano has 5+ year track record with 17 approved packages. Stable maintainer transition. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:codefluency.com | AI (email-domain): Domain belongs to original (now inactive) maintainer bruce; current publisher is miguelsolano. Theoretical risk but not actionable for this well-established package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package predating Sigstore provenance; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.9.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.9.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.9.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.8.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.8.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.8.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.8.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.9.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'codefluency.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'codefluency.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.7.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'codefluency.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.