tar-pack
Package and un-package modules of some sort (in tar/gz bundles).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from shinnn to es128 occurred in 2016; es128 is a well-established publisher with strong track record. Legitimate maintainer transition. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package published in 2016, before Sigstore provenance existed. Expected for this era of packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.4.1 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.4.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.3.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.2.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.1.4 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.1.3 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.1.2 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.1.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.0.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 8 / 2 |
v3.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-10-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-02-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-12-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.