supertap
Generate TAP output
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): vdemedes is the listed author of supertap; the transfer from novemberborn to vdemedes is a legitimate ownership return to the original author, consistent with package.json and repo URL. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.1 | 4 / 20 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 20 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 15 | |
| 1.0.0 | 5 / 15 |
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.