superstatic
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require uses _.kebabCase on a hardcoded array of names to load known local middleware files — not user-controlled input, no arbitrary module loading risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.0.0 | 17 / 30 | |
| 9.2.0 | 17 / 30 | |
| 9.1.0 | 18 / 29 | |
| 9.0.3 | 19 / 29 | |
| 9.0.2 | 19 / 29 | |
| 9.0.1 | 19 / 29 | |
| 9.0.0 | 19 / 29 |
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.