subscriptions-transport-ws
A websocket transport for GraphQL subscriptions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Established Apollo ecosystem package with 40+ approved versions; missing gitHead alone is insufficient signal given clean diff, trusted publisher history, and no other risk indicators. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/node | AI (phantom-deps): @types/node is a TypeScript type definition package; it is consumed by the TypeScript compiler, not imported directly in source code. Expected pattern for TS projects. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:coverage/lcov-report/prettify.js | AI (source-diff): This is the standard Google Code Prettify JS bundled by Istanbul in lcov HTML coverage reports. Minified by design; not malicious. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change (danielr → mxstbr) in 2018 reflects documented Apollo team transition; mxstbr is a well-known Apollo ecosystem contributor with strong track record. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): jbaxleyiii and mxstbr are well-known Apollo/GraphQL ecosystem maintainers; addition in 2018 reflects legitimate project stewardship transfer. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:stubailo.com | AI (email-domain): Domain belongs to Sasha Stubailo, a well-known Apollo/GraphQL contributor. Package is 3500+ days old with strong ecosystem trust; risk of domain hijack affecting this established package is low. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Postinstall runs standard TypeScript compilation (node scripts/post-install.js); legitimate build step for this package type. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process import in postinstall is expected for build setup; script is auditable in public repo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:graphql-tag | AI (phantom-deps): graphql-tag is properly declared as a runtime dependency and used in the package; phantom-dep rule is a false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/ws | AI (phantom-deps): @types/ws is a TypeScript type definition package; phantom-dep detection is a stable false positive for TypeScript projects. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash.assign | AI (phantom-deps): lodash.assign is declared and used; phantom-dep finding is a false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:es6-promise | AI (phantom-deps): es6-promise is referenced in config/example files but not directly imported in main code. Benign packaging issue for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:node-static | AI (phantom-deps): node-static is used only in example/test config, not in the main runtime code. Phantom dep finding is a packaging hygiene issue, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this established package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:backo2 | AI (dependencies): backo2 is a well-known, minimal exponential backoff utility; a stable, benign dependency for this package across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 49 of 49)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.11.0 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.10.0 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.9.19 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.9.17 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.9.16 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.9.15 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.9.14 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.9.13 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.9.12 | 5 / 21 | |
| 0.9.11 | 8 / 21 | |
| 0.9.10 | 8 / 20 | |
| 0.9.9 | 8 / 20 | |
| 0.9.8 | 8 / 20 | |
| 0.9.7 | 8 / 20 | |
| 0.9.6 | 8 / 20 | |
| 0.9.5 | 8 / 20 | |
| 0.9.4 | 9 / 20 | |
| 0.9.3 | 9 / 20 | |
| 0.9.2 | 9 / 20 | |
| 0.8.1 | 9 / 18 | |
| 0.8.0 | 9 / 18 | |
| 0.7.3 | 10 / 16 | |
| 0.7.2 | 10 / 16 | |
| 0.7.1 | 10 / 16 | |
| 0.7.0 | 10 / 16 | |
| 0.6.0 | 9 / 15 | |
| 0.5.5 | 9 / 16 | |
| 0.5.4 | 8 / 17 | |
| 0.5.3 | 8 / 17 | |
| 0.5.2 | 8 / 17 | |
| 0.5.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.4.0 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.3.1 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.2.6 | 8 / 24 | |
| 0.2.5 | 7 / 24 | |
| 0.2.4 | 7 / 22 | |
| 0.2.3 | 7 / 22 | |
| 0.2.2 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.2.1 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.2.0 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.1.6 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.1.5 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.1.4 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.1.3 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.1.2 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.1.0 | 5 / 16 |
v0.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-09-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.10
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: danielr.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.8
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: danielr.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-03-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.1
3 findingsScript: node scripts/post-install.js
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.0
3 findingsScript: node scripts/post-install.js
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.2
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.5
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.4
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.2
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.6
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-10-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stubailo.com' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.