strings
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change jonschlinkert→doowb occurred in Jan 2014 within the known sellside/assemble team. Both are prolific, trusted npm maintainers. Legitimate transition, stable for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): doowb (Brian Woodward) is a well-known maintainer in the assemble/sellside ecosystem; this addition is a decade-old legitimate team transition. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by years; absence is expected and not a security concern for this established package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:clone-shallow | AI (phantom-deps): Minor code hygiene issue — declared but not directly imported. Not a security risk for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.2 | 8 / 4 | |
| 0.4.1 | 8 / 4 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.3.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.2.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.1.4 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.1.3 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.1.2 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.1.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 4 / 5 |
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.