string.prototype.endswith
A robust & optimized `String.prototype.endsWith` polyfill, based on the ECMAScript 6 specification.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): google-wombot is the known es-shims automation account used by ljharb's org; this transition is consistent with the broader es-shims ecosystem pattern and is not a takeover signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): google-wombot is a known legitimate automation account for the es-shims ecosystem; addition is expected for packages migrated to this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): nicolo-ribaudo's removal is consistent with a legitimate org-level transfer to the es-shims/google-wombot maintainer group. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): call-bind is a well-known, widely-approved es-shims utility; its addition reflects standard es-shims refactoring, not a supply chain attack. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with strong ecosystem trust; lack of provenance attestation is a minor concern, not a disqualifier. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 9 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 9 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-09-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.