stack-trace
Get v8 stack traces as an array of CallSite objects.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer change occurred in 2014; sebastianhoitz has 12+ years of history and 9 approved packages. Legitimate transfer, not a hijack. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Previous maintainers removed as part of a legitimate 2014 transfer to sebastianhoitz, a long-standing trusted publisher. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed back to felixge, the original author per package.json and GitHub repo. Legitimate maintainer transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): gajus added as maintainer on a mature, high-download package with no code changes. Legitimate collaboration. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.10 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.9 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v1.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-05-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.8
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (felixge, tim-smart) were replaced by new maintainers (sebastianhoitz). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-02-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.