sort-route-addresses
Sort Sails/Express-style route addresses by inclusivity
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change reflects a legitimate Sails.js team transition (mikermcneil → eashaw). Both are known Sails.js org members; eashaw has 842 approved packages. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): rachaelshaw and eashaw are known Sails.js team members. Addition is a legitimate org-level maintainer update, not a suspicious takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy is consistent with a stable utility package. No code changes were made; this was an administrative ownership update within the Sails.js org. | ai |
v0.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.