signale
👋 Hackable console logger
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): signale 0.0.0 is the legitimate initial release from 2908 days ago with 2.8M weekly downloads; version 0.0.0 is not suspicious in this context. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): signale is a well-established package with 2.8M weekly downloads and 6 approved-dep edges; sparse early-version metadata does not indicate spam or low value. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:figures | AI (dependencies): figures is a well-known sindresorhus package for terminal Unicode symbols; a stable, legitimate dependency for a console logger like signale. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): klauscfhq → klaussinani is a documented personal npm username rebranding by the same author (Klaus Sinani). Repository and author email are consistent with the new identity. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Same rebranding event; klaussinani is the same person as klauscfhq. Not a third-party takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package was published in 2019, predating Sigstore/npm provenance attestation. No provenance is expected for releases of this era. | ai |
v1.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.