sha3
The Keccak family of hashing algorithms.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from parkr to canterberry in 2018; canterberry has long track record with 33 approved packages. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:twuni.net | AI (email-domain): Theoretical domain hijack risk but no evidence of active compromise; package content unchanged and maintainer has long history. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Same legitimate transition as publisher change; canterberry added as maintainer in 2018, stable since. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:install | AI (install-scripts): node-gyp rebuild is the standard install script for native C++ addons; sha3 is a legitimate native binding with gypfile:true. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:nan | AI (phantom-deps): nan is a C++ native addon helper referenced in binding.gyp/C++ code, not JS imports; expected for native modules. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Native-to-pure-JS rewrite naturally increases JS source size; prior version had most logic in compiled C++. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): v2.0 rewrote from native C++ addon to pure JS; 28 new source files is expected for this transition. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Added 'buffer' (standard polyfill) while removing 'nan' native dep; net reduction in attack surface. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Long-standing maintainer; gitHead absence is a publish-environment change, not a security signal for this established package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates provenance adoption; publisher is consistent and long-established. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.4 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.1.3 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.1.2 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.0.7 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.0.6 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.0.5 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.0.4 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.0.3 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 1.2.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 1 |
v2.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.7
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.6
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.5
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: canterberry.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: canterberry.
v2.0.0
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: canterberry.
v1.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: canterberry.
v1.2.1
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'twuni.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: canterberry.
v1.2.0
2 findingsScript: node-gyp rebuild
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.