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secure-random

Normalize the creation of cryptographically strong random values.

8
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

jprichardson

Keywords

cryptocryptographysecurerandomrandgeneratornumber

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
maintainer-change maintainer-takeover AI (maintainer-change): jp and jprichardson are the same person (JP Richardson); the repo URL and author field both confirm jprichardson as the original author. This is an account consolidation, not a hostile takeover. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Publisher change from jp to jprichardson reflects the same author (JP Richardson) migrating to a new npm account matching their GitHub handle. Not a compromise. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): jprichardson is the original author JP Richardson under a different npm account; addition is benign. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): Removal of jp account is part of the same author's account consolidation to jprichardson; not a hostile removal. ai

Versions (showing 8 of 8)

Version Deps Published
1.1.2 0 / 3
1.1.1 0 / 3
1.1.0 0 / 3
1.0.0 0 / 3
0.2.1 0 / 2
0.2.0 0 / 2
0.1.0 0 / 2
0.0.1 0 / 2

v1.1.2

3 findings
HIGH Complete maintainer takeover detected maintainer-change

All previous maintainers (jp) were replaced by new maintainers (jprichardson). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

HIGH Publisher changed: jp → jprichardson (on 2019-05-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.