scrawl
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): The 'takeover' is a display-name vs. npm-username normalization artifact: 'caolan mcmahon' and 'caolan' are the same person (Caolan McMahon, author of async.js). No real ownership change occurred. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer 'caolan' is the same individual as prior maintainer 'caolan mcmahon'; this is a name normalization change, not a new party gaining access. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): 'caolan mcmahon' display name was replaced by npm username 'caolan' — same person, not a genuine removal of a prior maintainer. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Sparse metadata is typical of early-era npm packages from this well-known author; no malicious signals present. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance by over a decade; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
2 findingsAll previous maintainers (caolan mcmahon) were replaced by new maintainers (caolan). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
2 findingsAll previous maintainers (caolan mcmahon) were replaced by new maintainers (caolan). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.