sails-util
Shared utilities between sails, waterline, etc.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:index.js | AI (source-diff): index.js contains readable, well-commented utility code for Sails.js. Long lines are from utility functions/regexes, not obfuscation. False positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:index.js | AI (source-diff): The eval usage is guarded by a strict JSON-safe regex whitelist. No actual dropper/loader behavior present. Legitimate utility library pattern. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Package is 4868 days old from trusted publisher balderdashy; 0.0.0 reflects early Sails.js ecosystem versioning, not malicious intent. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): sgress454 is a known balderdashy/sails core contributor with 1368 approved packages; transition from particlebanana is a legitimate org-internal handoff. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:switchback | AI (phantom-deps): switchback is a declared dependency used indirectly; phantom-dep false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): eval() is guarded by a strict regex whitelist — a well-known safe JSON parsing pattern. Input is validated before eval is called; not an arbitrary code execution risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.11.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.10.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.10.4 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.10.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.10.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.10.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 2 / 0 |
v0.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2016-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.6
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.10.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.2
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-05-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.10.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.