runstorm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Shell runner intentionally merges process.env with user-supplied env for child process execution; stable pattern for this package. | ai |
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/electrovir/runstorm/blob/b3b2ae9746091a6fe1757f306b708dfa7af1251f/src/shell-worker/worker.ts#L24 22 | const result = await runShellCommand(workerCommand.command, { 23 | cwd: workerCommand.cwd || undefined, > 24 | env: { 25 | ...process.env, 26 | ...workerCommand.env,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.