rollup-plugin-replace
[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/rollup-plugin-replace)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:minimatch | AI (phantom-deps): minimatch is legitimately used by the plugin for glob pattern matching; false positive from analyzer. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:magic-string | AI (phantom-deps): magic-string is core to the plugin's code transformation functionality; false positive from analyzer. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:rollup-pluginutils | AI (phantom-deps): rollup-pluginutils is standard for rollup plugins; false positive from analyzer. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Legacy package with 10+ years history, 114k weekly downloads, and ecosystem trust; metadata gaps are benign. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): lukastaegert is a core Rollup maintainer; this is a known legitimate transfer within the rollup GitHub org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published in 2018, before Sigstore provenance existed. Not actionable for this package's era. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from Rich Harris to Lukas Taegert-Atkinson, a core Rollup maintainer. Well-documented handoff within the rollup org. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 12 | |
| 2.1.1 | 2 / 11 | |
| 2.1.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.2.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 7 |
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-10-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.