revalidator
A cross-browser / node.js validator powered by JSON Schema
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:validator | AI (typosquat): revalidator is a distinct, 14-year-old legitimate package by a well-known publisher; the name similarity to 'validator' is coincidental and not a typosquat. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): indexzero is the original author (Charlie Robbins) of revalidator and the flatiron org; publisher change in 2014 is a legitimate transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Normal team change in the flatiron ecosystem; indexzero is the project creator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package last published in 2014, before Sigstore/provenance existed. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:Apache 2.0 | AI (license): Apache 2.0 is a standard permissive license; formatting variant triggers false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.8 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.7 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 1 |
v0.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-10-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-06-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2012-11-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2012-10-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2012-06-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2012-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.