requizzle
Swizzle a little something into your require() calls.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): requizzle's core purpose is wrapping require(); dynamic require(targetPath) is intentional and expected throughout this package, not a security concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 4336 days old and predates Sigstore provenance; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.4 | 1 / 8 | |
| 0.2.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 6 |
v0.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.