request-progress
Tracks the download progress of a request made with mikeal/request, giving insight of various metrics including progress percent, download speed and time remaining
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:node-eta | AI (dependencies): node-eta is a legitimate ETA calculation library, appropriate for a download progress tracker. No malicious signals; the dependency is a natural fit for this package's purpose. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:throttleit | AI (dependencies): throttleit is a well-known, minimal throttling utility with a long npm history; its use here is appropriate and stable for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): node-eta is a functionally appropriate dependency for a download-progress tracking library; no malicious indicators present. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 4664 days old, predating Sigstore provenance on npm. Absence of provenance is expected and not a security risk for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 2 |
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.