reflect.ownkeys
ES2015 spec-compliant shim for Reflect.ownKeys
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate transfer from glenjamin to ljharb (es-shims maintainer). Original author listed as contributor; repo under es-shims org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): ljharb and es-shims-owner added as maintainers — standard es-shims org pattern for ljharb-maintained packages. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New deps (define-properties, es-abstract, globalthis) are all core es-shims ecosystem packages maintained by ljharb. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Stable polyfill shim by ljharb; infrequent releases are expected. Publisher track record makes account takeover implausible. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): ljharb's es-shims packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; not a risk signal for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.6 | 6 / 13 | |
| 1.1.5 | 6 / 13 | |
| 1.1.4 | 5 / 13 | |
| 1.1.3 | 5 / 13 | |
| 1.1.2 | 5 / 13 | |
| 1.1.1 | 4 / 13 | |
| 1.1.0 | 4 / 11 | |
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 1 |
v1.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-02-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.