reflect
JavaScript parser adhering to Mozilla's parser API
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:standalone/reflect.js | AI (source-diff): The standalone/reflect.js file is a minified browser bundle of the reflect.js parser, built with jison/uglify-js as documented. Content is readable parser code, not malicious obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is fully explained by addition of the 226KB standalone browser bundle, a legitimate distribution artifact for this parser library. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:test/stringify-test.js | AI (source-diff): Test file for a JS parser; string literals containing JS code are parser test inputs, not malicious network+exec payloads. False positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:test/test.js | AI (source-diff): test/test.js is a large parser test suite (Esprima-style) that evaluates JS snippets by design; network+exec pattern is inherent to JS parser testing, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/parser.js | AI (source-diff): dist/parser.js is a Jison-generated parser (explicitly marked as such in the file header), consistent with the package's purpose and devDependencies. Long lines are normal for Jison output, not obfuscation. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 2 |
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.