redux-saga
Saga middleware for Redux to handle Side Effects
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; legitimate transition for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Bot account replaced by GitHub Actions CI; expected during CI migration. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): @babel/runtime is injected by @babel/plugin-transform-runtime, not directly imported. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): redux-saga is a 10+ year old package with 1.5M weekly downloads; bogus-package signals are false positives from wrapper package structure. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@redux-saga/core | AI (dependencies): redux-saga is intentionally a thin proxy package for @redux-saga/core — this is the project's documented split-package architecture, stable across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with 1.5M weekly downloads and 3,800+ day history; lack of provenance attestation is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 1.4.3 | 2 / 4 | |
| 1.4.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.4.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.4.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 12 |
v1.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.