redux
Predictable state container for JavaScript apps
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): timdorr is a known long-standing Redux core maintainer; publisher rotation between acemarke and timdorr is expected for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:es/redux.mjs | AI (source-diff): Function('return this') is a standard global-this polyfill from symbol-observable; no actual network calls. False positive on minified build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:es/redux.mjs | AI (source-diff): Minified rollup+terser build output of redux source; recognizable API surface (createStore, compose, etc.). Standard for this package's ES module bundle. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:loose-envify | AI (phantom-deps): loose-envify is used as a browserify transform declared in package.json, not a direct import. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Major version migrated build tooling (Babel→tsup/TypeScript), producing new dist file structure. Expected for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/redux.browser.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard minified browser bundle produced by tsup; content is clearly Redux source code with Redux error codes and API surface. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Redux is a cornerstone package; missing gitHead reflects a publish-environment change, not a security concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Redux predates Sigstore adoption; lack of provenance is expected for legacy publish workflows. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): gaearon (Dan Abramov) is Redux's creator, not spam. README heuristic is a false positive for this major ecosystem package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 68)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.0.1 | 0 / 20 | |
| 5.0.0 | 0 / 20 | |
| 4.2.1 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.2.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.1.2 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.1.1 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 38 | |
| 4.0.5 | 2 / 33 | |
| 4.0.4 | 2 / 33 | |
| 4.0.3 | 2 / 33 | |
| 4.0.2 | 2 / 33 | |
| 4.0.1 | 2 / 30 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 27 | |
| 3.7.2 | 4 / 45 | |
| 3.7.1 | 4 / 45 | |
| 3.7.0 | 4 / 45 | |
| 3.6.0 | 4 / 41 | |
| 3.5.2 | 4 / 39 | |
| 3.5.1 | 4 / 39 | |
| 3.5.0 | 4 / 39 | |
| 3.4.0 | 3 / 38 | |
| 3.3.1 | 3 / 36 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 36 | |
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 36 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 14 | |
| 3.1.7 | 1 / 14 | |
| 3.1.6 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.1.5 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.1.4 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.1.3 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.1.2 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.1.1 | 0 / 13 | |
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 13 | |
| 3.0.6 | 0 / 13 | |
| 3.0.5 | 0 / 13 | |
| 3.0.4 | 0 / 13 | |
| 3.0.3 | 0 / 13 | |
| 3.0.2 | 0 / 14 | |
| 3.0.1 | 0 / 14 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 15 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 0.12.0 | 1 / 17 | |
| 0.11.1 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.11.0 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.10.1 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.10.0 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.9.0 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.8.1 | 5 / 10 | |
| 0.8.0 | 5 / 10 |
v5.0.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: acemarke.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: acemarke.
v4.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-10-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-08-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.