read-installed
Read all the installed packages in a folder, and return a tree structure with all the data.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:aoaioxxysz.net | AI (email-domain): Legacy maintainer email from original author (ogd); current publisher is iarna since 2015. Domain is stale but not actively exploited; risk is theoretical for this long-established package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; absence of attestation is expected for this era of publishing and not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from othiym23 to zkat occurred in 2015; both are well-known npm ecosystem contributors. This is a long-settled, legitimate maintainer transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): zkat is a highly trusted npm publisher (1468 approved packages). Maintainer addition dates to 2015 and is a known legitimate transition. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): isaacs spam flag is a false positive — isaacs is a foundational npm/Node.js contributor. No-keywords signal is trivial for this established utility package. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.3 | 7 / 3 | |
| 4.0.2 | 7 / 3 | |
| 4.0.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 4.0.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 3.1.5 | 7 / 3 | |
| 3.1.4 | 7 / 3 | |
| 3.1.3 | 7 / 3 | |
| 3.1.2 | 7 / 3 | |
| 3.1.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 2.0.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.2.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 5 / 0 |
v4.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-09-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-07-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-06-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.0
3 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'aoaioxxysz.net' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-04-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-09-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-08-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.