react-live
A production-focused playground for live editing React code
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:plckthn.me | AI (email-domain): Phil Plückthun's personal domain; publisher is jpdriver who has npm publish access. Lapsed DNS on author email doesn't grant publish rights. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package now publishes with SLSA provenance attestation, which supersedes gitHead as a supply chain integrity signal. Missing gitHead reflects CI/CD pipeline change. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Normal team change at FormidableLabs; publisher unchanged and highly trusted (374 approved packages). | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): react-live is a live code playground; new Function() is its core mechanism for evaluating user-provided React code. Expected and stable. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate 2018 maintainer transition; sofiapoh is a long-standing trusted publisher with 64 approved packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Pre-provenance-era package; no Sigstore attestation expected for 2018 publishes. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 64)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.8 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.1.7 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.1.6 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.1.5 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.1.4 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.1.3 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.1.2 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.1.1 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.1.0 | 3 / 31 | |
| 4.0.1 | 3 / 49 | |
| 4.0.0 | 3 / 49 | |
| 3.2.0 | 3 / 37 | |
| 3.1.2 | 3 / 37 | |
| 3.1.1 | 3 / 37 | |
| 3.1.0 | 3 / 37 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 37 | |
| 2.4.1 | 8 / 35 | |
| 2.4.0 | 8 / 36 | |
| 2.3.0 | 8 / 35 | |
| 2.2.3 | 7 / 35 | |
| 2.2.2 | 8 / 35 | |
| 2.2.1 | 8 / 35 | |
| 2.2.0 | 8 / 35 | |
| 2.1.2 | 8 / 35 | |
| 2.1.1 | 8 / 35 | |
| 2.1.0 | 8 / 35 | |
| 2.0.1 | 8 / 27 | |
| 2.0.0 | 8 / 27 | |
| 1.12.0 | 7 / 27 | |
| 1.11.0 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.10.1 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.10.0 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.9.2 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.9.1 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.9.0 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.7.1 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.7.0 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.6.1 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.6.0 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.5.4 | 6 / 26 | |
| 1.5.3 | 6 / 23 | |
| 1.5.2 | 6 / 23 | |
| 1.5.1 | 6 / 23 | |
| 1.5.0 | 6 / 23 | |
| 1.4.10 | 6 / 23 | |
| 1.4.9 | 6 / 23 | |
| 1.4.8 | 5 / 23 | |
| 1.4.7 | 5 / 23 | |
| 1.4.6 | 5 / 23 | |
| 1.4.5 | 5 / 23 | |
| 1.4.4 | 5 / 23 |
v4.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: formidablelabs.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: formidablelabs.
v4.1.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: formidablelabs.
v4.1.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: formidablelabs.
v4.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: formidablelabs.
v4.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'plckthn.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Maintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'plckthn.me' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.