re-emitter
Re emit events from another emitter
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Transfer from raynos to feross in 2014 is a well-documented, consensual handoff. Feross is explicitly listed as contributor in package.json and the repo URL reflects the transfer. No hijack indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change to feross in 2014 is a legitimate transfer; feross is a highly trusted publisher (1947 approved packages) and is listed as contributor in package.json. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): feross added as maintainer is part of the same legitimate 2014 transfer; no ongoing risk. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): raynos removal is part of the same consensual 2014 transfer to feross; no ongoing risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance; absence of attestation is expected for 2014-era packages and carries no security weight. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.1.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v1.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (raynos) were replaced by new maintainers (feross). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2014-07-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.