rc-tooltip
React Tooltip
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is from including dumi documentation build artifacts in dist/. Packaging hygiene issue, not security. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/umi.eda5a0fe.js | AI (source-diff): Main dumi/umi framework bundle for documentation site. Standard webpack output. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/umi.eda5a0fe.js | AI (source-diff): Dumi framework bundle naturally contains fetch and dynamic imports for async chunk loading — not malicious. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/2.9e6b3c3a.async.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled dumi documentation chunk, not obfuscated malware. Standard for react-component packages that include doc builds. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/710.4bd4b8ec.async.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled dumi documentation chunk containing SVG icons and demo driver code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/900.c953409b.async.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled dumi documentation chunk with React utility code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/demos.c17fa5e5.async.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled demo page showing tooltip placement examples — clearly documentation output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/docs__changelog.md.863e6698.async.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled changelog documentation page, clearly dumi output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/docs__index.md.6f18bdc3.async.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled index documentation page with badge images, clearly dumi output. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): react-component ecosystem predates Sigstore; no provenance is normal for this org's packages. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Both zombiej and afc163 are known react-component/ant-design core maintainers; routine team rotation. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 95)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.4.0 | 4 / 18 | |
| 6.3.2 | 3 / 18 | |
| 6.3.1 | 3 / 18 | |
| 6.3.0 | 3 / 18 | |
| 6.2.1 | 3 / 18 | |
| 6.2.0 | 3 / 17 | |
| 6.1.3 | 3 / 17 | |
| 6.1.2 | 3 / 17 | |
| 6.1.1 | 3 / 17 | |
| 6.1.0 | 3 / 17 | |
| 6.0.1 | 3 / 17 | |
| 6.0.0 | 3 / 17 | |
| 5.3.1 | 3 / 16 | |
| 5.3.0 | 3 / 16 | |
| 5.2.2 | 3 / 18 | |
| 5.2.1 | 2 / 18 | |
| 5.2.0 | 2 / 18 | |
| 5.1.1 | 2 / 18 | |
| 5.1.0 | 2 / 18 | |
| 5.0.2 | 2 / 15 | |
| 5.0.1 | 2 / 15 | |
| 5.0.0 | 1 / 15 | |
| 4.2.3 | 2 / 15 | |
| 4.2.2 | 1 / 15 | |
| 4.2.1 | 1 / 14 | |
| 4.2.0 | 1 / 14 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 14 | |
| 4.0.3 | 1 / 14 | |
| 4.0.2 | 1 / 13 | |
| 4.0.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 3.7.3 | 3 / 9 | |
| 3.7.2 | 3 / 9 | |
| 3.7.1 | 3 / 9 | |
| 3.7.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 3.6.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 3.5.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 3.4.9 | 3 / 10 | |
| 3.4.8 | 3 / 10 | |
| 3.4.7 | 3 / 10 | |
| 3.4.6 | 3 / 10 | |
| 3.4.5 | 3 / 9 | |
| 3.4.3 | 2 / 9 | |
| 3.4.2 | 1 / 10 | |
| 3.4.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 3.3.5 | 1 / 10 | |
| 3.3.4 | 1 / 10 | |
| 3.3.3 | 1 / 10 | |
| 3.3.2 | 1 / 11 | |
| 3.3.1 | 1 / 11 |
v6.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-03-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
9 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-02-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.0.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.