rc-progress
progress ui component for react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): zombiej is a known react-component org maintainer alongside afc163; this is a legitimate team transition within the Ant Design ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of Sigstore provenance is common for react-component packages; not a security concern for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 51)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.0 | 3 / 24 | |
| 3.5.1 | 3 / 21 | |
| 3.5.0 | 3 / 21 | |
| 3.4.2 | 3 / 20 | |
| 3.4.1 | 3 / 20 | |
| 3.4.0 | 3 / 19 | |
| 3.3.3 | 3 / 19 | |
| 3.3.2 | 3 / 19 | |
| 3.3.1 | 3 / 19 | |
| 3.3.0 | 3 / 19 | |
| 3.2.4 | 3 / 18 | |
| 3.2.2 | 3 / 18 | |
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 18 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 18 | |
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 18 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 18 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 16 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 16 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 16 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.6.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.6.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.5.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.5.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.5.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.5.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.4.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.4.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.3.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.2.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.2.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.2.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.2.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.2.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.2.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.2.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.6 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 6 |
v3.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-12-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-05-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.