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randombytes

random bytes from browserify stand alone

9
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

cwmmadcousensindutnyjprichardson

Keywords

cryptorandom

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Legitimate 2015 maintainer transition within crypto-browserify org; cwmma → dcousens is well-documented and nearly a decade old. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): dcousens, dominictarr, jp are all known crypto-browserify ecosystem maintainers; legitimate team addition. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Published in 2015, before Sigstore provenance existed; expected for this era of packages. ai
source-diff source-size-dropped AI (source-diff): Package is a tiny utility; size drop reflects cleanup of unnecessary files, not malicious stub replacement. ai

Versions (showing 9 of 9)

Version Deps Published
2.1.0 1 / 5
2.0.6 1 / 5
2.0.5 1 / 5
2.0.4 1 / 5
2.0.3 0 / 5
2.0.2 0 / 5
2.0.1 0 / 2
2.0.0 0 / 2
1.0.0 0 / 2

v2.0.6

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: cwmma → dcousens (on 2017-06-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2017-06-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: cwmma → dcousens (on 2015-01-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2015-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.