questpie
Server-first TypeScript backend framework with a proxy-based field builder, collections, globals, standalone routes, background jobs, and a generated REST API.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/config-B2McXHXc.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript declaration file (.d.mts) with long lines from concatenated type exports; not executable obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/config-BhqSsm60.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript declaration file with long lines from drizzle-orm/zod type exports; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/config-S4wtBU28.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Long-line TypeScript declaration file (.d.mts) from bundled type rollup; not executable, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/config-CTEFqHhe.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript declaration file; long lines are normal for rolled-up .d.mts outputs from drizzle-orm/zod/better-auth types. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/types.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are TypeScript type declaration imports from a large framework build, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/builders.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Long lines in .d.mts are bundled TypeScript type re-exports from tsdown, not obfuscation; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@react-email/components | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep; used in config/templates rather than direct import — stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@drepkovsky/tinydi | AI (dependencies): Scoped DI container package from same author ecosystem; no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:flydrive | AI (dependencies): flydrive is a legitimate file storage abstraction library; no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pino-pretty | AI (phantom-deps): pino-pretty is a declared runtime dep used as a pino transport; config-only reference is expected for this logging pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@drepkovsky/tinydi | AI (phantom-deps): DI container likely referenced via config/type imports rather than direct import; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 43 of 43)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.7.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.6.1 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.6.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.5.6 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.5.5 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.5.4 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.5.3 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.5.2 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.5.1 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.5.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.4.1 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.4.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.3.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.2.7 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.2.6 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.2.5 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.2.4 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.2.3 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.2.2 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.2.1 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.2.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.1.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.9 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.8 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.7 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.6 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.5 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.4 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.3 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.2 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.1 | 11 / 13 | |
| 3.0.0 | 11 / 13 | |
| 2.0.0 | 13 / 13 | |
| 1.1.1 | 13 / 13 | |
| 1.1.0 | 13 / 13 | |
| 1.0.5 | 13 / 13 | |
| 1.0.4 | 13 / 13 | |
| 1.0.3 | 9 / 17 | |
| 1.0.2 | 9 / 17 | |
| 1.0.1 | 9 / 17 | |
| 1.0.0 | 9 / 18 | |
| 0.0.2 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.0.1 | 17 / 9 |
v3.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.6
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.5
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.3
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.2
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.