pullstream
A stream you can pull data from.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition from joeferner to evanoxfeld within the same org (nearinfinity) in 2013. evanoxfeld has strong track record. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): evanoxfeld is a long-standing co-maintainer of this package with 46 approved packages and no rejections. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Added dependency is setimmediate, a well-known polyfill; not suspicious. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is 5000+ days old with 14 versions and 104k weekly downloads. Lack of provenance is expected for packages of this age and is not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.4.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.2.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 1 |
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-03-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2013-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.